INTRODUCTION
Debate about priorities among creditors has extended for over twenty years and, while slowing, hasn't ended in a consensus. Most of the focus of this debate has been on secured credit.
1 But secured credit persists notwithstanding various academic criticisms about it. The interesting questions about priority thus shift to the variegated world of unsecured credit. And the battlefield for such priority fights today is in the Bankruptcy Code. If secured creditors can take all the pie for which they've contracted, do the remaining unsecured creditors share the pie equally? Or, are some unsecured creditors more equal than others? The answer to the latter questions is of course yes. Beginning with section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Congress determined that one sort of unsecured creditors-employees-have statutory priority over other unsecured creditors in the event of bankruptcy. 3 Not much has been written about the history or justification for this statutory priority. 4 Granting that secured creditors will enjoy the fruits of their consensual interests in a debtor's property, why should any creditor who has not contracted for priority nonetheless obtain it? Could the wage priority be efficient? Or is this priority better explained by principles outside the sphere of the market? Part I of this Article summarizes the legal history of the wage priority in bankruptcy beginning with the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. With barely an acknowledgement of priority among creditors in 1800, we will see a process of ever-increasing legislative growth in the protection of employees in America's bankruptcy law. We [T]he said assignee or assignees [chosen by the creditors] shall be allowed and retain all such sum and sums of money, as they shall have paid or expended in suing out and prosecuting the commission, and all other just allowances on account of, or by reason or means of their being assignee or assignees .... 14 id.
[T]he said commissioners shall order such part of the nett [sic] produce of the said bankrupt's estate ... to be forthwith divided among such of the bankrupt's creditors as have duly proved their debts ... in proportion to their several and respective debts ....
Notwithstanding the initial emphasis of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 on equality of all creditors, section 62 provided for one set of priority claimants whose identity should come as no surprise:
[N]othing contained in this law shall, in any manner, effect the right or preference to prior satisfaction of debts due to the United States as secured or provided by any law heretofore passed, nor shall be construed to lessen or impair any right to, or security for, money due to the United States or to any of them.
Section 62 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was almost certainly intended to preserve the federal priority statute enacted only three years earlier by the Fourth Congress, which provided the United States government "shall be paid first" for all obligations to the federal government. See Act of Mar. 3, 1797 , ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515 (1797 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (2000)); Harrison, 9 U.S. at 299-300 (holding section 62 of Bankruptcy Act of 1800 specifically preserved fights contained in federal priority statute).
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After the repeal of the 1800 Act, Congress left its bankruptcy power unused until another business depression beginning in 1837.1 5 The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 more closely resembles current bankruptcy law than the 1800 Act. ' Relief under the 1841 Act was explicitly voluntary 7 and with certain exceptions was available to all residents (not merely merchants) of the United States and its territories.' 8 The 1841 Act expressly preserved liens and security that were otherwise valid under state law. 9 Pro rata distributions were the norm, 20 18, § 2 ("[N] othing in this act contained shall be construed to annul, destroy, or impair ... any liens, mortgages, or other securities on property, real or personal, which may be valid by the laws of the States respectively ... .
See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, supra note 18, § 5: ("[A]II creditors coming in and proving their debts ... shall be entitled to share in the bankrupt's property and effects, pro rata, without any priority or preference whatsoever ...."). The failure of the 1841 Act to make specific provision for priority distributions to secured creditors does not mean that Twenty-Seventh Congress, dominated by Whigs, opposed commercial interests. Instead, the District or Circuit Courts under the 1841 Act had plenary (and non-appealable) jurisdiction to decide the rights of secured creditors by applying state law. See, e.g., Waller's Lessee v. Best, 44 U.S. 111, 120 (1845) (holding state law governed timing of creation of execution liens); Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. 292, 319 (1845) (holding delays accompanying piecemeal consideration of secured claims in multiple state courts could be "avoided [,] by bringing the whole matters in controversy between all the mortgagees before the District Court of Circuit Court, making them all parties to the summary proceedings in equity, and thus enabling the court to marshal the rights, and priorities, and claims, of all the parties ... ."); see also Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking In a were now three categories of priority among creditors: debts to the United States, debts to sureties of federal obligations, and wages due to "operatives" (employees). 2 1
Insertion of a priority for unpaid wages reflected the effects of increasing industrialization. In his ground-breaking book THE MARKET REVOLUTION, Charles Sellers begins a narrative with America's Colonial society comprised of selfcontained, rural, agrarian communities and urban artisans. 2 2 Domesticity and community solidarity characterized this Jeffersonian idyll. Viewed in prospect, neither bankruptcy nor a wage priority were necessary. Credit would hardly exist outside the small class of merchants. 23 And, given a pre-industrial economy, most employees would have been apprentices or farm hands from the community whose interests would be protected by close personal relationships. Beginning in the Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6 (2006) ("The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 provided that district courts' jurisdiction in bankruptcy was 'to be exercised summarily, in the nature of summary proceedings in equity."'). 21 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, supra note 18, section 5 continues to read as follows:
[E]xcept only for debts due by such bankruptcy to the United States, and for all debts due by him to persons who, by the laws of the United States, have a preference, in consequence of having paid moneys as his sureties, which shall be first paid out of the assets; and any person who shall have performed any labor as an operative in the service of any bankrupt shall be entitled to receive the full amount of the wages due to him for such labor, not exceeding twenty-five dollars .... for extra pay for extra work qualified as priority claim of "operative" notwithstanding possible unenforceability of claim under state law). A year later the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a virtually identical provision affording priority to "operatives" under Massachusetts law and wrote:
Congress
We are not aware, that this clause has received any judicial construction, and the word "operative," without more qualification than this clause contains, is not definite enough to enable us to lay down any precise general rule. Probably the primary thought, which legislators had in mind, was the wages due to men and women working in manufactories, who usually receive their pay weekly or monthly. But certainly, it is not limited to those working for manufacturers, or mechanics, or to persons working in factories or workshops. Whether it shall extend to farm-laborers, to house servants, to persons working singly or in gangs, in woods, or on marshes, or under contractors on public works, at a distance from the home both of the employer and 
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THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE also for the first time authorized the assignee to sell encumbered property for the benefit of creditors, 35 who were to enjoy an equality of distribution as of first importance. 3 6 The 1867 Act clarified the distribution rights of secured creditors by expressly allowing them to share in dividends for the difference between the value of the collateral and the debt. 37 Administrative expenses and, for the first time, compensation of the assignee had first priority in distribution. 3 8 Section 27 of the 1867 Act provided that all unsecured claims were to be paid pro rata with the exception of employees whose priority was increased to fifty dollars. 39 The next section of the Act, however, provided for five levels of priority:
When a creditor has a mortgage or pledge of real or personal property of the bankrupt, or a lien thereon for securing the payment of a debt owing to him from the bankrupt, he shall be admitted as a creditor only for the balance of the debt after deducting the value of such property .... Regardless of the relationship between sections 27 and 28 of the 1867 Act, unpaid wages continued to enjoy a limited but substantial priority. The wage priority had, however, fallen one place and was now behind certain state claims over which it would have enjoyed priority under the 1841 Act. Judicial construction of section 28 was generous. A father claiming wages on behalf of his minor son 41 and a temporary accountant 42 were both afforded priority. However, in 1878 the District Court drew the line: there would be no priority for an amount due for services to be rendered under an employment contract, which the bankrupt had breached when it went out of business. 4 3 While the Register in bankruptcy had relied on the family-protection policy of the law 44 to allow the employee a priority for future wages he would have earned but for his employer's cessation of business, the District Court disagreed. Relying on the plain meaning of section 28 ("for wages due ... for labor performed . . . ."), the court concluded that the claimant "has not performed labor, and he is not entitled to wages which are a compensation for labor., 45 
In re

B. The 1898 Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 so far has been the most lasting effort of Congress to legislate in the field of bankruptcy. 47 The 1898 Act continued to provide priority for wage claims, but the relative priority changed several times. Initially, the priorities of the 1898 Act followed the Act of 1867. Secured claims were unaffected by the Act and secured creditors received their collateral, or its value, before any unsecured creditors. 48 Section 64a appeared to provide first priority for taxes, 49 but section 64b went on to provide for all priority claims, including taxes. Wage claims appeared in section 64b as a fourth level priority to the extent of three hundred dollars for "wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants" now earned only 50 within three months of the adjudication of bankruptcy.
Judicial analysis of the scope of the priority tended toward the narrow with some exceptions. Learned Hand noted that each member of the trilogy of the 1898 Act (workmen, clerks, and servants) expanded on their predecessors under the 1867 Act. Yet, earlier he had been unwilling to extend the priority to a manager of a broker's branch office 52 and fifteen years later he held that "it would be an abuse of 49 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 47, § 64a ("The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district, or municipality in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors .... ").
'o Id. at § 64b. Slocumb was neither a workman, a clerk, nor a servant, in the sense in which these limiting words are used. If congress had intended this provision to extend to presidents of commercial corporations, it would have said so. Presidents of such corporations do not generally act as workmen, clerks, or servants, but exercise authority over these classes, occasionally arbitrary and oppressive, but always in a way to let them know the president is not one of them.
F. 950, 952 (E.D.N.C. 1899). 55 The majority in In re Grubbs-Wiley Grocery Co. stated:
Ordinarily a workman is understood to be 'one who labors ... one who is employed in labor.' Doubtless the statute has reference to a workman employed on some character of work,-laboring for some person who sustains to him the relation of an employer or master, for whom he works. So, also, the term 'servant' ordinarily means a person employed by another to render personal services to the employer .... This claimant was himself a stockholder ... and was one of the board of directors, and was its general manager .... He was not a servant, as he had no master over him [... ] It is true, he was, in a certain sense, working for the corporation, the legal entity; but.., he was the representative of the corporate body. Co., 218 F. at 954 (noting 1906 Amendment of Bankruptcy Act section 64b, cl. 4, expressly included traveling salesmen and agents selling on salary or commission); Caldwell, 164 F. at 516 ("When Congress found that some of the courts, giving that provision of the act a strict construction, had managing an "outsourced" but in-house department of a manufacturing company, a plant superintendent who performed extensive manual labor, a general manager and shop superintendent, 62 or a teacher. 63 Even a surety who had advanced funds to the bankrupt for payment of wages could not be subrogated to the wage-earners' priority, 64 although a specific wage assignment did carry the wage-earner's priority. 65 held that a traveling salesman was not within the classes mentioned, it amended the act so as to avoid that construction by adding the words 'traveling or city salesmen.") (citations omitted Y. 1934 ) (holding that a teacher is not a "workman," "clerk," "salesman," or "servant"); see also In re Lawsam Elec. Co., 300 F. 736, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924 ) ("The statute was intended to favor those who could not be expected to know anything of the credit of their employer, but must accept a job as it comes, to whom the personal factor in employment is not a practicable consideration."); In re Gay & Sturgis, 233 F. 604, 605 (D. Mass. 1916 ) ("I doubt whether the earnings of a professional man, employed primarily because of his learning and his ability to advise helpfully, are properly described as 'wages'...."). Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, 242 F.2d 375, 377 n.5, 378 n.6 (2d Cir. 1957 ) (holding "where collective bargaining agreement provided only for payments by employer to welfare fund, with no assignment or deduction of workmen's wages, welfare fund was not entitled to wage claim priority against bankrupt employer"). [Vol. 16: 121 Under the 1898 Act courts again articulated a paternalistic rationale for the wage priority. "All creditors are supposed to stand upon an equal footing before the law .... 66 Nonetheless, courts frequently observed that "[t]he bankruptcy act, while primarily intended to secure an equal distribution of the assets of the bankrupt among his creditors, evinces a strong intent on the part of Congress to protect those who are dependent on their daily earnings for their support ....
Advancing this paternalistic argument the Ninth Circuit recognized the precarious nature of working class life when it remarked that "[piriority of payment was intended for the benefit only of those who are dependent upon their wages, and who, having lost their employment by the bankruptcy, would be in need of such protection.' 68 Even the Supreme Court acknowledged this rationale in 1912 in Guaranty Title when it held that the wage claims under the 1898 Act had priority over the contractual obligations due to the United States. 69 However, anticipating concerns for nonadjusting creditors, which would be more specifically articulated forty years later, 7° the District Court articulated a different ground for the priority when it noted that typical wage-earners cannot be "expected to know the credit standing of their employer but must accept employment as it comes., 71 Thus, three factors animated the courts' application of section 64b (and, after 1938, section 64a): a strong emphasis on creditor equality coupled with the assertion that typical employees could not effectively protect their interests, and The policy which dictated it was beneficent and well might induce a postponement of the claims, even of the sovereign, in favor of those who necessarily depended upon their daily labor. And to give such claims priority could in no case seriously affect the sovereign. To deny them priority would in all cases seriously affect the claimants.
70 Professors Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried seems to have introduced the term "nonadjusting creditor" in their seminal work The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy. As they later explained,
[a] 'nonadjusting' creditor is a creditor that, for one reason or another, cannot or does not adjust the terms of its loan to reflect the effect on its loan of all the arrangements the borrower enters into with other creditors, including the creation of security interests which, under full priority, completely subordinate the nonadjusting creditors' claim in bankruptcy. Caldwell, 164 F. at 516 (noting Congress' intention to protect workers who are dependent on their daily earnings for their support); In re Lawsam Electric Co., Inc., 300 F. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (refusing claim for wages because claimant was not in disadvantaged position of workman or servant). As Learned Hand put it, "[t]he statute was intended to favor those who could not be expected to know anything of the credit of their employer, but must accept a job as it comes, to whom the personal factor in employment is not a practicable consideration." Id. Class bias was also at work. According to Hand, a radio engineer "is not in the same economic class as the workers [and] . . . would have been the first to resent the notion that he was a workman or a servant." Id. Of course, the engineer had sought priority for his unpaid wages, which seems to belie Hand's characterization of the claimant's putative class consciousness. [Vol.
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Unsurprisingly, given the political dynamics of the 1930s, holders of wage claims were the clear beneficiaries of the 1938 amendments. Congress repositioned the wage priority upward and slightly broadened the class of its beneficiaries, clarifying that part-time and non-exclusive traveling salesmen also enjoyed priority. 76 Yet the apparent improvement of priority for wage claims was tempered because three priorities of the preceding version of the statute were folded into an enhanced category of administrative claims. 77 With their move to a second priority position, unpaid wage earners enjoyed their highest priority ever. And for the first time Congress subordinated all federal claims, including tax claims, to those of wage earners.
The 1898 Act continued to undergo modifications until its repeal in 1978.78 None of these later amendments changed the high priority status of wage claims afforded with the 1938 Chandler Act. 79 Yet at all times under the 1898 Act, and notwithstanding the continued permutation and expansion of its priority provisions, the Court continued to assert that "the broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among creditors. . 79 See Act of July 30, 1956 , ch. 784, Pub. L. No. 840 (1956 (widening definition of traveling salesmen in 1956); Act of July 5, 1966 , Pub. L. No. 89-496, 80 Stat. 270 (1966 (repealed 1978) (modifying extent of priority of tax claims in 1966); see also McCoid, supra note 76, at 280 ("Though not similarly protected in the fourth draft, wage claims given priority attained that advantage in the fifth and the final drafts.").
80 Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930) . See Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 451 (1937) ("[Tlhe object of bankrupfcy laws is the equitable distribution of the debtor's assets amongst his creditors ...."); Tabb, supra note 10, at 25 ("Much of the 1898 Act was directed not at debtor relief, but rather at facilitating the equitable and efficient administration and distribution of the debtor's property to creditors.").
Employee benefits other than wages achieved substantial prominence after World War 11.81 Thus it is not surprising that the question of whether the wage priority extended to such benefits eventually came to the fore. The Supreme Court decided two benefits priority cases under the 1898 Act. In United States v. Embassy Rest., Inc. 82 a six-member majority held that mandatory employer contributions to a union welfare fund required under a collective bargaining agreement did not qualify as "wages ... due to workmen. '83 The majority concluded that the contributions were neither wages nor were they due the employees. The contributions, even though 84 mandatory, were just that-contributions.
Further, they were not due to "workmen" because the contributions were to be paid to the trustees of the welfare funds maintained by unions. 85 Nor, the Court noted, were the contributions held in separate accounts for the benefit of specific members. 8 6 The majority also cited principal and pragmatic reasons for its decision. Citing one of its earlier bankruptcy cases for the proposition that "[tlhe broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate, 87 and a labor case for the axiom that exemptions are to be strictly construed, 88 the Court noted that the wage priority pre-dated the existence of non- wage employee benefits and that the "few and guarded amendments" subsequent to 1898 evidenced Congress' limited solicitude for employees. 89 Re-emphasizing the employee-trustee distinction, the majority also expressed a new concern: that permitting benefits contributions to share priority with employee wages would end up "reducing his own recovery," 90 an anti-dilution argument. Finally, the Court returned to the paternalistic principle of its 1912 Guarantee Title 9 l decision by restating what it believed to be the fundamental policy of the wage priority: "the purpose of Congress has constantly been to enable employees displaced by bankruptcy to secure, with some promptness, the money directly due them in back wages, and thus to alleviate in some degree the hardship that unemployment usually brings to workers and their families. 9 2 Regardless of the pedantic logic of the Court's reasoning, the unique dependence on wages for the masses in the labor market and a heightened concern for the effects of unemployment on closely related third parties clearly animated the majority's analysis. Nine years later another six-member majority held that unpaid mandatory contributions to an annuity plan that were credited to the accounts of specific employees were not priority claims. In Joint Indus. Bd. v. United States 93 the Court extended the holding of Embassy Rest. to an obligation to an annuity payable upon the employee's death, retirement, or disability. 94 Although crediting the contributions to an employee's individual account looked more "wage-like" than the non-allocated welfare benefits addressed in Embassy Rest., the majority cited three principal reasons for not relaxing its prior narrow construction. The Court first reiterated the fundamental purpose for the wage priority it had identified in Guarantee Title and Embassy Rest.: promptly to secure back pay to alleviate "the hardship that unemployment usually brings to workers and their families. 9 5 The majority reasoned that the annuity benefits were thus not wage-like because "nothing was payable to employees except upon the occurrence of certain events. This class of claim has been given a preferred position in the Bankruptcy Act for over 100 years, long before welfare funds played any part in labor negotiations. True, the Congress has amended the Act, but such amendments have been few and guarded ones, such as raising the ceiling on the amount permitted, shifting the relative priorities and enlarging the class to salesmen, clerks, etc. package, were not wages because they were not currently available to the employee. 97 The majority next returned to its pragmatic anti-dilution rationale:
If delinquent contributions to welfare and annuity funds providing deferred benefits to employees were to have equal priority with wages payable directly to employees, the maximum payable immediately and directly to employees would be reduced whenever the individual wage claims approached $600 or whenever the assets of the estate would not permit all wage claims to be paid in full.
98
In dicta, the majority extended this reasoning to the protection of junior priority creditors, particularly citing concern for fourth priority claims such as workers compensation. 9 9 Finally, the Court noted that Congress had reenacted section 64a of the 1898 Act after Embassy Rest. without change, from which it inferred Congressional acquiescence in its earlier decision.
1°° The Court's paternalistic concern arising out of the dependence of most employees on quick payment of wages to allow them to buy their daily bread constrained its interpretation of "wages." Its pragmatic concern about the effects of broadening the wage priority on both wage earners and those lower on the priority list solidified the Court's conclusion that any change in the scope of the wage priority should come from Congress.
C. The 1978 Code
Work on completely reworking the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 began with a Joint Resolution in 1968,101 culminating with the creation the Commission of the 97 See Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v. U.S., 391 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1968) ("[T]he employee could not assign, pledge, or borrow against the contributions, or otherwise use them as his own. Quite obviously the annuity fund was not intended to relieve the distress of temporary unemployment, whether arising from the bankruptcy of the employer or for some other reason.").
98 Id. at 228-29. 99 See id. ("[I] ncreasing the amounts payable to second priority creditors would reduce the assets available for distribution to lower priority claimants and general creditors, including wage claimants not entitled to priority."). The Court specifically addressed the negative impact of expanding the wage priority on various taxes in a footnote.
It is instructive that workmen's compensation claims were not provable in bankruptcy until 1934, when they were given a seventh priority. In 1938 the priority for compensation claims was abolished. Moreover, taxes and Social Security contributions which are withheld from wages are entitled to a fourth priority as taxes rather than a second priority as wages. This change had the effect of moving the wage priority down one place, but given the infrequency of significant wage claims in individual bankruptcies, it should not have substantial distributional effects.
Id
II. HOWARD DELIVERY SERVICE V. ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE
Howard Delivery Service (hereinafter "Howard") was an erstwhile West Virginia-based interstate freight carrier that operated in a dozen states and employed nearly 500 people. °7 Howard had contracted with Zurich to provide it with workers' compensation insurance in ten of those states.'°8 By the time Howard filed chapter 11 in January of 2002, it owed Zurich upwards of $400,000 in unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums.1°9 Zurich ultimately filed a proof of claim for $410,215 that asserted priority under section 507(a)(4), for "contributions to an employee benefit plan."" 0 Howard objected to Zurich's claim of priority status and the Bankruptcy Court upheld the objection.'
1 The District Court affirmed. 112 Zurich then appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed, 2 to 1.11 3 Each of the 102 See Law of July 24, 1970 , Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970 . 103 See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978 .
' 04 See Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 207 (1994) REv. 499, 509 (1996) ("[S] ection 207 does nothing more nor less than increase the earned wages priority of Code section 507(a)(3) from $2,000.00 to $4,000.00 and clarifies that this protection extends to certain independent sales representatives." The Fourth Circuit was not the first to consider the claim of priority for unpaid workers' compensation premiums. Over a decade earlier the Ninth Circuit held that workers' compensation insurance was an "employee benefit" plan." 6 The court concluded that neither the statutory mandate of workers' compensation nor the fact that workers' compensation was not a "wage substitute" could deny unpaid insurance premiums their bankruptcy priority.7 The two decisions intervening before the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Howard Delivery went the other way. The Eighth' 18 and Tenth'' 9 Circuits agreed that the legislative history of section 507(a)(4) excluded workers' compensation from its scope. The latter circuits held that only bargained-for benefits enjoyed priority.
For the third time when considering the priority of employee benefits the Supreme Court split 6 to 3. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer joined. (5) is to capture portions of employee compensation for services rendered not covered by § 507(a)(4)." And this "main office" did not extend to unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums. In other words, only "fringe benefits [that] generally complement, or 'substitute' for, hourly pay' 25 enjoy priority status. And workers' compensation premiums did not fall into the wage substitute or even wage compliment categories. The majority buttressed its narrow reading of section 507(a)(5) from three directions: first, the broader ERISA definition of employee benefits was inapplicable to construction of the Bankruptcy Code, second, workers' compensation is not a uniquely employee benefit, and the long-standing twin policies of equality of distribution and third, the corresponding narrow construction of priorities.' 6 At the outset of its opinion the majority explained that it refused to read ERISA's definition of the almost identical expression ("employee welfare benefit plan") into the "employee benefit plan" of the Bankruptcy Code because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code authorized the Court to do so. 27 [under § 507(a) (4)] ... [allowing] the provider of an employee benefit plan to recover unpaid premiums"); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 59 (1978) (explaining section 507(a)(5) created "new priority for consumer creditor-those who have deposited money in connection with ... purchase of services ... that were not delivered or provided").
125 Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2111. 126 Id. at 2112-13, 2116 (noting federal court question "whether ERISA is appropriately used to fill in blanks in a Bankruptcy Code provision," recognizing workers' compensation provides both fixed payments for employees' on-the-job injuries and protects employers from significant tort liability, and using "corollary principle that provisions allowing preferences must be tightly construed" in applying the Code); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) 213, 219-220 (1996) ) (citations omitted)).
had cross-referenced a few Bankruptcy Code sections to other statutes, 128 the majority inferred that the lack of a cross-reference to ERISA in section 507(a)(5) disabled the Court from doing so of its own accord.
129
The majority next compared workers' compensation to the types of employee benefits at issue in Joint Indus. Bd. and Embassy Rest. Unlike payments to union welfare funds and retirement annuities that benefit employees with no concomitant gain to employers, "[w]orkers' compensation regimes .. .provide something for employees-they assure limited fixed payments for on-the-job injuries-and something for employers-they remove the risk of large judgments and heavy cost generated by tort litigation. ' 130 The six members of the majority also made much of the nearly universally compulsory nature of workers' compensation insurance. While acknowledging that not all states mandate that employers purchase workers' compensation insurance, the majority asserted that the largely compulsory nature of workers' compensation distinguished commitments to employee benefit plans, which benefit from bankruptcy priority, from run of the mill insurance obligations, which do not.
132 Finally, the majority noted that granting priority status to an insurer like Zurich would have the anomalous effect of preferring debts to a private insurance carrier over general obligations such as taxes owing to a state. Without committing themselves, the majority strongly suggested that debts owed by employers to a state workers' compensation fund would enjoy only the standard 129 Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2113 (noting Congress did not include directions construing section 507(a)(5) terminology, therefore, Court may not write them into text.). 130 Id. Basic economics teaches that one party to commercial transaction would not benefit another without something in return: "Providing health care to workers fosters a healthy and happy workforce, and a contented workforce benefits employers." Id. at 2114, n.6. So the majority distinguished traditional employee welfare payments from workers' compensation benefits by asserting they were of a different "order:"
[T]he benefit employers gain from providing health and pension plans for their employees is of a secondary order . . . . These benefits redound to the employer reflexively, as a consequence of the benefit to the employee. Workers' compensation insurance, by contrast, directly benefits insured employers by eliminating their tort liability for workplace accidents.
Id.
131 See id. at 2114 ("Further distancing workers' compensation arrangements from bargained-for or voluntarily accorded fringe benefits, nearly all States, with limited exceptions, require employers to participate in their workers' compensation systems.").
132Id. ("We simply count it [mandated participation in workers' compensation systems] a factor relevant to our assessment that States overwhelmingly prescribe and regulate insurance coverage for on-the-job accidents, while commonly leaving pension, health, and life insurance plans to private ordering.").
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THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE eighth level priority for unsecured claims of governmental units, three levels below the priority for obligations to employee benefit plans.
33
Only after canvassing the standard tools of statutory construction did the majority cite two of the long-standing policies adduced to support its narrow construction of priority provisions. " [W] e are guided in reaching our decision," according to the Justice Ginsburg, "by the equal distribution objective underlying the Bankruptcy Code, and the corollary principle that provisions allowing preferences must be tightly construed."' 3 4 As it had in Joint Indus. Bd., the majority justified narrow construction of priorities out of a pragmatic concern for general unsecured creditors. Every dollar that goes to higher priority creditors would diminish the funds available for those of a lower priority. 35 And, as it had in both Embassy Rest. and Joint Indus. Bd., the Court mentioned the anti-dilution argument and expressed apprehension that expanding the scope of the priority would redound to the detriment of employees whose direct section 507(a)(5) fringe benefits could be reduced by the. indirect benefits of workers' compensation premiums. 1 36 The majority did not, however, mention the fundamental and longstanding normative principle it had first stated in Guarantee Title and employed in both Joint Indus. Bd. and Embassy Rest.: concern for prompt alleviation of the economic distress suffered by workers and their families occasioned by employer insolvency.1 37 The Court nowhere explained why this argument had lost its cogency. Perhaps the presence of widespread and more generous unemployment 133 Id. at 2115 ("We venture only this observation: It is common for Congress to prefer Government creditors over private creditors [citation omitted]; it would be anomalous, however, to advance Zurich's claim to level (a)(5) while leaving state-fund creditors at level (a) (8) .") (citing New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. West Virginia Workers' Comp. Fund, 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1989)). The majority's opinion failed to note that to hold otherwise would have been inconsistent with its decision in Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912) . In Guarantee Title the Court had concluded that the priority granted to wages over federal taxes under the 1 898 Act implicitly modified the long-standing Federal Priority Statute of 1797. To grant a private creditor's claim for premiums that would otherwise have been paid to a state a priority equal to wages would subvert the policy of the wage priority:
The policy which dictated it [the priority of wages over taxes in the 1898 Act] was beneficent and might well induce a postponement of the claims, even of the sovereign, in favor of those who necessarily depended upon their daily labor. And to give such claims priority could in no case seriously affect the sovereign. To deny them priority would in all cases seriously affect the claimants.
Guaranty Title, 224 U.S. at 160.
134 Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2116 (rejecting Zurich's argument that giving claim section 507(a)(5) status would incentivize workers' compensation carriers to continue coverage of failing enterprise, thus rehabilitating the business). 135 See id. at 2116: ("Every claim granted priority status reduces the funds available to general unsecured creditors and may diminish the recovery of other claimants qualifying for equal or lesser priorities."); supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 136 See Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2116 ("Opening the (a)(5) priority to workers' compensation carriers could shrink the amount available to cover unpaid contributions to plans paradigmatically qualifying as wage surrogates .... "); supra text accompanying notes 131-132. 137 See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
benefits lessened this concern. Or, perhaps observation of the glacial pace of many corporate reorganizations undercut the connection between priority and timeliness of relief. Or perhaps the shift from concern for family integrity to advocacy of individual autonomy occasioned the elision of this principle from the Court's set of important policies. 38 In any event, the majority concluded by reiterating the equality principle and restating the argument it had made forty years earlier in Joint Indus. Bd. that it was for Congress to specifically provide for deviations from those policies.
Any doubt concerning the appropriate characterization [of unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums], we conclude, is best resolved in accord with the Bankruptcy Code's equal distribution aim. We therefore reject the expanded interpretation Zurich invites. Unless and until Congress otherwise directs, we hold that carriers' claims for unpaid workers' compensation premiums remain outside the priority allowed by § 507(a)(5).
I. EFFICIENCY, AUTONOMY, OR JUSTICE?
A. Employees as Maladjusting Creditors
A number of bankruptcy scholars have argued that the impact of consensual secured credit on priority should be limited where third parties do not have the capacity to adjust their prices or credit terms. 140 Tort claimants are the archetypal examples of non-adjusting creditors.' 4 ' And employees are frequently cited as another instance of non-adjusting creditors. 1 42 But unlike tort victims, employees voluntarily choose their employer and assent to the terms of the employment relationship. Indeed, as Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook have recently noted, in theory "[e]mployees can protect themselves from the risk of their employer's insolvency by investigating the company's financial condition and either seeking employment elsewhere or demanding higher wages to reflect the risk .... , They quickly go on, however, to make the following three points in arguing for the practical inability of employees to adjust their services in light of the financial condition of their employers:
The substantial sophistication and the high transaction costs required to obtain the necessary information present significant barriers. Moreover, the costs of moving from one employer to another can be quite onerous . . . . Similarly, although most creditors have the option of spreading their risks by extending credit to several customers, this option is not available to employees, who are unlikely to work for more than a single employer. 44
including "nonconsenting tort claimants in consent-oriented framework" of secured credit despite inability of tort claimants to adjust claims). 142 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, supra note 70, at 885
We have just seen that involuntary creditors are not able to adjust the size of their claims when a borrower creates a security interest in favor of another creditor because their claims are fixed by law. But the fact that a creditor voluntarily contracts with a firm does not necessarily make that creditor adjusting with respect to any security interest created by the firm. Many of a firm's voluntary creditors are customers, employees, and trade creditors that have relatively small claims against the firm. Even though these creditors may sometimes, in principle, be able to take the existence of a security interest into account in contracting with the firm, the small size of their claims will generally make it irrational for them to do so. Warren and Westbrook characterize employees as "maladjusting" creditors. 45 While they have the potential to adjust their prices or places of employment, employees cannot effectively do so. Since 1887 the courts have acknowledged this perspective when construing the wage priority. 146 Yet its cogency is questionable. Why should the law protect employees who fail to adjust by moving from a financially weak employer to one that appears more solvent? Or who fail to bargain for security or an increase in compensation to account for the risk of nonpayment? Doesn't the wage priority create a moral hazard?
Recognizing the weakness of Warren and Westbrook's analysis, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried take a slightly different route to arrive at the same destination. They do not argue that employees cannot adjust, but instead believe that it would be irrational for them to do so: "Many of a firm's voluntary creditors are . . . employees .. . . Even though these creditors can, in principle, take the existence of a security interest into account in contracting with the firm, the small size of their claims will generally make it rational for them not to do so."' 14 7 Simply put, the costs of calibrating the price of employment services to the potential value of unencumbered assets in the event of bankruptcy outweigh the benefit. It is thus irrational for individual employees to adjust. But Bebchuk and Fried do not address whether the employment market as a whole has adjusted for the possibility of nonpayment of wages when a firm enters bankruptcy. It may be the case that a portion of market-driven wages includes an "insolvency premium" to insure against the risk of nonpayment.
Because Warren and Westbrook believe that the labor market regularly falls employees on its own terms, they conclude that non-market intervention is necessary. The particular form of non-market intervention for their purposes is retention of a "mandatory" Bankruptcy Code in lieu of various suggested "contractual" insolvency alternatives that they describe in their article. 48 Thus, 145 Id. ("Employees in these circumstances might fairly be described as maladjusting creditors."). Warren and Westbrook do not clearly define "these circumstances." Are the concerns they raise about the practical ability of employees to adjust the price of their services (or take their services elsewhere) characteristic of all employees or only a subset? Intuitively there would seem to be many individual employees who can and do adjust prices in light of their employer's financial condition. See id. at 1239; 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(2) (2006) (limiting administrative expense priority for certain severance payments to "key employees"). in fact, later in their article Warren and Westbrook admit as much: "We recognize that some of the creditors identified in these categories are only candidates for classification as maladjusting creditors; the information about them is too sketchy to permit a confident evaluation of their prebankruptcy readjustment capacities." Warren & Westbrook, supra note 143, at 1238. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (2006) (limiting administrative expense priority for certain severance payments to "key employees").
'46 See People v. Remington & Sons, 10 N.Y.S. 310 (1887 while Warren and Westbrook do not address specifically the wage priority in section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code, we can reasonably assume that its presence is one of the non-market factors that they believe should be retained in any bankruptcy law. Bebchuk and Fried similarly do not address the wage priority. But one would hardly seem justified given their conclusion about the irrationality of employee evaluations of employer solvency. A wage priority would only reinforce the decision not to adjust, again creating a moral hazard.
B. Employees as Autonomous Economic Actors
It is by no means clear that economic arguments will resolve the wisdom of the wage priority provision. Perhaps wage earners can protect themselves through pricing their services, changing employers, or simply by staying put even with financially troubled firms if economically rational. Or, failing those alternatives, maybe they are sufficiently protected by the market generally, and do not need special priority protection in the Bankruptcy Code.
If only vindicating personal autonomy justifies coercive state action, Congress had little warrant for creating a priority for wage earners. The limitations on employee bargaining noted above hardly rise to the level of the incapacity typically associated with governmental paternalism. Employees are neither mentally nor physically disabled from acting rationally. Not all states offer employees a priority claim upon the insolvency of their employers; why should the federal government do so in bankruptcy? 4 9 Nor are there any legal impediments to bargaining for security by employees. In fact, employees can have a strong bargaining position: "where the employer is attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy, the employees will almost always be crucial to the success of such an undertaking."' ' 50 A hands-off policy toward wage priorities is consistent with classical liberal economic and political thought. And the Court's omission of reference to the needs of the employee's family is certainly consistent with the individualistic bent of autonomy-based theories of ethics.
(where the debtor and each creditor negotiate a contract for dealing with insolvency, the last of which is controlling on all hy should a worker whose claim against its employer outside of bankruptcy is a general unsecured claim suddenly enjoy a preferred position merely by the happenstance of its employer filing for bankruptcy?"). 150 Keating, supra note 4, at 907. Keating ultimately concludes that "[p]erhaps the best solution to the worker-priority issue is to eliminate the formal priorities and simply allow the workers to exercise what may be their best leverage anyway: their ability as valuable employees to affect whether or not their employer will prosper as a viable going-concern." Id. at 926. Some early New Jersey decisions remarked that the leverage of employees on foundering employers justified the state law preference. See, e.g., Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Cent. R.R., 29 N.J. Eq. 252 (N.J. Ch. 1878); Bedford v. Newark Mach. Co., 16 N.J. Eq. 117 (N.J. Ch. 1863) .
C. The Wage Priority as Justice
Assuming that economic theory is inconclusive for the wage priority, is there anything else to support it? Do wage earners (and their families) deserve a priority for any reason other than their putative inability to adjust to an employer's relative solvency? What are we to make of the Court's obeisance to the principle of equality of distribution in light of the growing number of bankruptcy priorities? To address the wage priority from a normative point of view takes us back to its origins in the 1841 Act.
The 1841 Bankruptcy Act represents perhaps the earliest example of the confluence of evangelical Christian moralism and a nationalist political party with strong business ties. The direct ancestors of twenty-first century evangelicals came into being in the early nineteenth century. As David Bebbington has observed, evangelical Christianity was and is characterized by four distinctives: biblicism (a particular regard for the Bible as the sole source for moral living and ethics); crucicentrism (a focus on the atoning work of Christ on the cross over other aspects of the biblical description of Christ's work); conversionism (the belief that everyone, even professing Christians, need an experience of conversion, frequently with an emphasis on emotional suasion); and activism (the belief that the Christian Gospel needs to be expressed in serious efforts)., 15 George Marsden describes antebellum evangelicalism in similar terms with its emphasis on the free individual, education, technique, "back to the Bible" for answers to life's questions, and social reform. 152 Bebbington's and Marsden's final distinctives of evangelicalism-activism and social reform-focusing on efforts by which the gospel was to be expressed, included the individual and the community. Evangelicals looked to reform the lives of individuals and the broader society in accord with their understanding of the Bible's moral strictures. Leading among the social expectations of ante-bellum evangelicals were temperance, 153 Americans from the dominant classes were intensely moralistic, with a strong sense of civic responsibility. Civic responsibility and charity were, in fact, lessons that were always taught alongside the work ethic and tempered its individualism.... So reform in America often has a middle-class base, appealing to the Judeo-Christian principles that each person has responsibilities for the welfare of all their neighbors. [Vol. 16:121 issues arising from the ballooning market-driven debtor-creditor relationship did not escape evangelicals' notice. None of these four distinctives was unique to evangelical Christianity; however, evangelicalism's reduction of the scope of Christianity to only these four is significant. Two of these distinctives are particularly important for purposes of the relationship of ante-bellum evangelicals to politics. The first was evangelicalism's emphasis on social action. Many evangelicals were post-millennialists. 156 That is, they believed that a reformation of the morality of American society would usher in Christ's millennial kingdom.
157 Social progress was identified with the Kingdom of God and spurred by the belief that such progress was a condition precedent to the eschatological hope of the end of the present age and the arrival of the golden age to come. 15 Millennial imagery had important implications for Americans at home as well. Americans regarded themselves, and were widely regarded, as "a city on the hill" for the advancement of civilization. They combined classic republicanism, Protestant dominance, and religious freedom into a belief that American civilization would be in the forefront of an outpouring of the Holy Spirit that would usher in the last millennial golden age of world civilization.
see also HOWE, supra note 22, at 469 ("The spread of literacy, discoveries in science and technology, even a rising standard of living, could all be interpreted-and were-as evidences of the approach of Christ's Second Coming and the messianic age foretold by the prophets, near at hand."); Diana Hochstedt 6 1 Citing pamphleteers, writers of short stories, other texts, and sermons, Balleisen paints a picture in which both sides of the credit relationship bore moral responsibilities to the other and even to third parties. For debtors, the "guiding lights for a failing American were 'a fair disclosure, a full surrender, and an equal distribution." ' 162 Creditors were not immune from evangelicals' moral strictures:
[T]he holders of claims against insolvents ought to respect the rightful interests of other parties. Rather than seek an advantage over his neighbor, the creditor of a bankrupt should deem his honor of more value than even the preference of a large percentage of pecuniary gain. Other prescriptions emphasized the duty of charity toward those who had suffered misfortune.
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Even the concept of property as "despotic dominion" became the object of critical moral analysis. A purposeful understanding of property as a means of large-scale social improvement moved the question of what could count as property into the realm of theological discussion.164
The continuing moralization of all debt is significant. Bruce Mann has argued in REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS that the waning years of the eighteenth century reflected both a mindset of debt (particularly the failure to repay it) as sin as well as a grudging but increasing recognition that debt was necessary for a commercial society:
[T]he moral economy of debt had lost its religious underpinnings by the end of the eighteenth century, at least for commercial debtor. The redefinition of insolvency from moral failure to economic risk did not eliminate debtors' legal obligations to repay their debts. Rather, it secularized the foundations of the moral obligation to repay . . . and changed the general understanding of how the law should treat failure. (1985) [T]he roots of the American reexamination of economic ethics are in the revivals of the pre-Civil War period. The origins of "social Christianity" in its modern forms were distinctly influenced by the new burst of evangelicalism. This [late Eighteenth-Century] alliance [of Calvinism and the Enlightenment had] produced both new shapes of democratic constitutional government and an interpretation of private property that was nearly absolute. But in the ante-bellum revival movements, the absoluteness of property was challenged .... Mann over-stated the secularizing influences of the burgeoning market economy. Notwithstanding an understanding of the commercial utility of debt that became widespread after the Founding era, both efficiency and morality continued to dominate the debates around the 1841 Act. Like the other moral causes of antebellum America-temperance, abolition of slavery, and women's rightsbankruptcy reformers cast their rhetoric in explicitly ethical terms. 166 Policy-makers of the early nineteenth century did not observe the contemporary compartmentalization of utility and morality. Distinct arguments stressing one or the other ethical theory were made but both were seen as part of a divinely ordered natural system in which what was efficient was providentially designed to correspond to virtue.' 67 As Balleisen observes, "when the economic dislocations of the late 1830s and early 1840s created political pressures for revisions of debtorcreditor law, and especially for the adoption of a national bankruptcy system, the creed of 'the church commercial' guided the labors of congressional draftsmen." [Tihe plunging, speculative, promoter type who came to typify the driving, high-risk segment of American business after the Revolution unwittingly contributed to the formation of attitudes essential to the acceptance of the discharge of debts. Initially the old morality prevailed. . . . However, as the nineteenth century advanced more and more Americans became tolerant of and indeed attracted to speculative ventures.... And so the pendulum of opinion swung from hostility to bankruptcy relief to an attitude that mixed indifference with tolerance and outright approval.
The congressional draftsmen in 1840 were the Whigs. 168 The Whig party was led by northern industrialists and western nationalists who had organized for the 1832 election and attempted to pull together all of the opposition the reelection of Andrew Jackson. 1 69 As articulated by Daniel Walker Howe, Whiggery stood for the triumph of the cosmopolitan and national over the provincial and local, of rational order over irrational spontaneity, of school-based learning over traditional folkway and customs, and of self-control over self-expression. Whigs believed that every person had the potential to become moral or good if family, school, and community nurtured the seed of goodness in his moral nature. is undeniable and is an interesting precursor of the contemporary relationship of evangelicals and the Republican Party.
17 6 Religious motivations for voluntary bankruptcy in general would certainly have trickled down the wage priority in particular.
With no success against Andrew Jackson or against Jackson's successor Martin Van Buren in 1836, the Whigs by 1840 found themselves with a real prospect of victory due to the lingering effects of the Panic of 1837. The decades preceding the election of 1840 had seen many states eliminating requirements for the franchise such as property ownership.
177 Given the increasing number of persons entitled to vote, especially in the industrialized North, 17 8 the Whigs needed to broaden their appeal to the newly enfranchised: "It was necessary to out-demagogue the Democrats."' ' 79 And one of the Whigs' means of reaching the non-elite masses was to capitalize on the continuing depression 80 and support bankruptcy legislation.' 8 ' The Whigs swept to victory with the election of William Henry Harrison and took control of Congress. And the support of evangelicals for the Whigs was crucial.
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Keeping their promise, "the Whig-dominated 27 th Congress again created a federal bankruptcy system, largely in the hope of attracting the political support of thousands of American whose businesses had failed .... 183 The breadth of who wage priority in terms of passages such as Leviticus 19:13,188 Deuteronomy 24:15,189 and James 5:4,190 each of which clearly enjoined the prompt payment of wages. 19 ' Other than payment of vows made to God, no specific financial obligation received such frequent biblical mention as the duty to pay wages to workers. The continuing moralization of the debtor-creditor relationship by ante-bellum commercial moralists, consistent with a plain reading of the Bible1 92 in the context of a market economy with a rising class of wage earners, carries considerable weight in understanding the moral calculus of the wage priority of the 1841 Act. And the references in judicial opinions prior to the Zurich American decision to the particular needs of wage-earners and their families over the course of more than a century suggest a continuing recognition of a normative moral principle underlying the wage priority.
CONCLUSION
Neither the majority nor the dissent in the Zurich American opinion referred to the principle of protection of employees and their families by prompt payment of wages that had animated previous decisions in this field. The dissent's reticence is 188 See Leviticus 19:13 (King James) ("Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbour, neither rob him: the wages of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning.") All biblical quotes are from the Authorized (King James) Version, the single translation commonly in use in nineteenth-century America.
189 See Deuteronomy 24:15 (King James) ("At his day thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it; for he is poor, and setteth his heart upon it: lest he cry against thee unto the LORD, and it be sin unto thee."). 190 See James 5:4 (King James) ("Behold, the hire of the labourers who have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth: and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of sabaoth."); WAYLAND, supra note 167, at 250 (quoting this passage in the context of directly applicable contemporary morality).
19 1 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 3 ("[B] iblical religion then permeated the culture in ways both conventional and sincerely felt."). 192 See HOWE, supra note 22, at 447
The Reformation principle of sola scriptura that the Bible contained all things necessary for salvation and could be properly interpreted by any conscientious believer, lived on and heavily influenced American culture. . . . Respect for the Bible conditioned national identity, social criticism, natural science, the educational system, and the interpretation of authoritative texts like the Constitution. In the years between the American Revolution and the Civil War, the Bible offered to many Americans a key for understanding not only private religious reality but also the public life of the country. The Scriptures were so widely used that it is not inaccurate to call the country a biblical nation during this period.
HOWE, supra note 22, at 475 ("The Bible occupied an even more prominent position in discussions of morality than it did in education and science. Pre-Civil War Americans debating moral issues almost always appealed to biblical authority.").
understandable: There is little reason to conclude that a policy of protecting workers from the vicissitudes of sudden unemployment would buttress awarding a priority for workers compensation insurance. Workers compensation insurance itself is consistent with the normative perspective of special protection for wage earners. Yet priority for the premiums due from employers seems too indirect to draw the same endorsement, especially when such a priority would dilute a state's lower priority for taxes levied for the same benefit. If neither of the forms ofemployee benefits addressed in Embassy Rest. (contributions to union welfare fund) or Joint Indus. Bd. (contributions to employee's annuity plan) fell within the policy of the wage priority, the more attenuated nature of workers compensation could scarcely do so. It is harder to understand the majority's silence. The Court's precedents had confirmed the purpose of the wage priority as a means by which employees and their families could get their daily bread. Each of the preceding six-member majorities had also established the corollary that deferred employee benefits did not fall within wage priority. Congress added section 507(a)(4) in 1978 only after concluding that fringe benefits had frequently come to substitute for wages over the course of the twentieth century. To be sure, employee benefits now enjoy a priority but that extended priority did not arise from the moral milieu of the original wage priority. Employee benefit plans did not have the same nexus to survival as did the prompt payment of wages. And neither commercial moralists nor evangelical activists played a role in sculpting the benefits priority. It is thus not surprising that the majority balked at expanding the reach of employee benefits priority. It is surprising that the opinion failed to acknowledge its consistency with a trajectory beginning over 160 years earlier and regularly confirmed thereafter.
The policy of the wage priority is firmly grounded in the physical needs of workers and their families. The justification of the wage priority certainly includes this policy but its early history suggests there was more to it than simple benevolence.
The transformative moral vision of ante-bellum American evangelicals believed in a foundation for that policy in a biblical-theological understanding of the calling of the United States as God's tool of universal reconciliation. Combined with the political calculations of the Whig party, theology influenced law. Additionally, the existence of the wage priority suggests a more full-orbed view of evangelical social action than is generally credited by contemporary evangelicals or their opponents. The durability of the wage priority suggests that at least some theological perspectives can be effectively translated into broadly acceptable social policies through conversion to public reasons, a truth that can inform contemporary debates on many issues.
